Introduction
There is a possibility for alliance to be formed when two regions face the hostile intruders. The alliance might lead to the formation of a nation. Each region may possess armed forces to protect its own territory from the intrusion. In some case, the formation of a nation stems from the conquest by an intruder. In other cases, however, it might stem from the alliance or coalition of the regions facing the intruders' attack. The aim of this paper is to examine the difference between the formation of a nation and the one of alliance of two regions. The service of armed force in this case is examined from the viewpoint of public goods for the each member of the regions, while it implies external diseconomy in the case of hostile two regions (Fukiharu [2005] ). When the "public good" aspect of armed force is featured as in this paper, its optimal level may be achieved by Lindahl mechanism. This mechanism may be utilized not only in each region, but also in forming alliance. The formation of alliance may require at least a feasibility condition. It is the Pareto-improvement: i.e. utility level for each region after the formation of alliance must be greater than the one before the formation. In Fukiharu [2004] , the author derived a positive conclusion in the case of alliance, showing that the revised Lindahl mechanism, Lindahl-Walras mechanism, satisfies the Pareto-improvement when the armed force is a Cobb-Douglas function of military goods and military personnel. Furthermore, the Lindahl-Walras mechanism is locally stable. In this paper simulations are conducted to examine if the Lindahl-Walras mechanism satisfies the feasible condition when the armed force is not a Cobb-Douglas function. The armed force in this paper is assumed to be a CES type function with positive parameter, and a couple of thema concerning the national defense are examined. For example, the difference between "the all volunteer force system" and "the draft system" is examined, by examining if the Pareto-optimum is realized through the Lindahl-Walras mechanism. Another theme is the difference between the formation of a nation and the one of an alliance.
ü Region A with Population 100
Population in region A, L 0 A , is assumed to be 100. Region A faces the hostile intruder C. Region A must offset the effect of attack by intruder C. Without the counterattack by region A, the intruder C invades freely into the region A, destroying the production facilities there. With the increase of the armed force in region A, the invasion by the intruder C could be reduced, thus, raising output for region A. There are two industries in region A. The industry 1 is the civilian good industry, which is owned by the households, producing the civilian good, x c1A , hiring labor, l cA , where output depends on the level of armed force, d A . Production function is assumed to be of the following Cobb-Douglas type.
The industry 2 is the military good industry, which is owned by the A's government, producing the military good, m A , utilizing civilian good, x mc1A , and labor, l mA . Production function is assumed to be of the following Cobb-Douglas type.
It is assumed that f 2 A does not depend on d A . Region A's level of armed force, d A , consists of military good, m A , and military personnel, v A .
The government provides the level of armed force by the minimum cost principle subject to (2A) where the price of civilian good is p c1A and the wage rate is w, on the assumption that the military personnel can be drafted with the civilian wage rate. Thus, given d A 0 , the government computes the demand for civilian good, x m1A D , the demand for labor, l mA D , and the demand for military personnel, v A D , given p c1A and w, by solving min p c1A x m1A +w(l mA +v A ) subject to (2A) and
In this section, suppose that (3A) is specified by the CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) type: In [2] := g = p * xm1 + w Hv + lmL; n = 1; t0 = −1 ê 2; d1 = 1 ê 2; d2 = 1 ê 2; L0 = 100; d = Hm^H−t0L + v^H−t0LL^H−n ê t0L; m = lm^d1 * xm1^d2; g1 = Simplify@PowerExpand@g − a Hd − d0LDD; g11 = 8D@g1, lmD 0, D@g1, xm1D 0, D@g1, vD 0<; w1 = w ê. Solve@g11@@1DD, wD@@1DD; p1 = p ê. Solve@g11@@2DD, pD@@1DD; sol2 = Solve@w ê p w1 ê p1, lmD@@1DD; w2 = w ê. Solve@g11@@3DD, wD@@1DD; sol1 = Solve@w1 w2, vD@@1DD; solx = Solve@Simplify@PowerExpand@d d0 ê. sol1 ê. sol2DD, xm1D@@1DD; soll = sol2 ê. solx; solv = Simplify@PowerExpand@sol1 ê. soll ê. solxDD; 8solx, soll, solv<
Utilizing these demand functions, the minimum cost function for providing the region A's level of armed force, d A 0 ,
cd [d A 0 ] , is given by the following function. Next, we examine the public good aspect of armed force. The service of armed force raises output of consumption good by offsetting the damage from invasion. It also raises the utility level of household. Thus, it has the property of public good. Lindahl mechanism has been known to achieve optimum provision of public good. In this mechanism, the government announces arbitrary shares of burden for providing public good to each member of the society. Each member replies with the desired level of armed force. There is no guarantee that those replied levels of armed force are the same. If they are not the same, the government announces different shares of burden to each member. Each member, then, replies with the desired level of armed force. If they are not the same, the government announces different shares of burden to each member. Continuing this process, the government searches for the consensus of the level of armed force among the members. The consumption good industry also shares the burden of keeping the armed force. Suppose that t f1 is the share of burden for the consumption good industry. The behavior of the industry is the following profit maximization. In [17] := f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; pi = p * f3 − w * l1 − tf1 * dc; s1 = Simplify@Solve@D@pi, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; sl = Solve@PowerExpand@D@pi, l1D 0 ê. s1D, l1D@@1DD; l1d = l1 ê. sl; sd = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1 ê. slDD; zf1d = d0 ê. sd; x1s = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. sl ê. sdDD; 8sl, sd, 8x1s<<
The resulting (expected) maximum profit, p A , is computed as follows. This profit is distributed to the household in region A.
In [25] := re1 = Simplify@PowerExpand@pi ê. sl ê. sdDD
The last agent is the (aggregate) household. As in the traditional approach, it maximizes utility subject to income constraint. Utility function is assumed to be of the following Cobb-Douglas type.
The government asks the desired level of armed force, by stipulating the share of burden for the household as t hA =1-t f1 . The household's behavior is formulated as in what follows.
In this paper, the household has no choice between working at civilian industry or military industry, enjoying leisure hours, and volunteering for the military personnel. In a sense, the fixed number of enjoyable leisure hours is subtracted from the initial holding of leisure hours. The numbers (or hours) of volunteers (or draftees) required for the armed force and required workers at the military industry are computed by the government and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry, with the military wage paid at the civilian wage rate, w. Thus, given p c1A , w and t hA , the household expresses its desired armed force, which implies that government computes the number (hours) of required military personnel and the one of workers at the military industry by the minimum cost principle, and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry. The remaining workers (or working hours) are employed at the civilian industry.
For the purpose of simulation, in this paper, parameters are stipulated. In [26] := u1 = xc1^H1 ê 2L * d0^H1 ê 2L; Simplify@sol2 = Solve@8D@u1, xc1D ê D@u1, d0D p ê Htf2 * D@dc, d0DL, p * xc1 + tf2 * dc == w * L0 + re1<, 8xc1, d0<D@@1DD ê. 8L0 → 100, w → 1, tf2 → 1 − tf1<D
ü General Equilibrium with Lindahl Mechanism
In the above examination, we derived demand and supply functions with p c1A , w, and t f1 , as the parameters. In Lindahl mechanism, by the correct selection of 0 §t f1 §1,
must hold. The selection of t f1 , however, must be done jointly with p c1A and w, since in order to compute the minimum cost for providing d A , prices, p c1A and w, must be known beforehand. Thus, p c1A , w, and t f1 as well as d A 0 must be determined in the context of general equilibrium. The consumption good market is in equilibrium if the following equation holds.
Labor market is in equilibrium if the following equation holds.
In the computation of general equilibrium with Lindahl mechanism, the Newton method is utilized with the normalization of w=1.
In [27] := xc1d = xc1 ê. sol2; zhd = d0 ê. sol2; check1 = 8Hx1s ê. w → 1L Hxm1 ê. solxL + xc1d, zhd zf1d, L0 Hlm ê. sollL + Hv ê. solvL + Hl1dL< ê. w → 1; sole = FindRoot@check1, 8p, 10<, 8tf1, 1 ê 5<, 8d0, 10<D 
It is confirmed that the Walras-Lindahl mechanism is locally stable at general equilibrium, since all the eigen values of the Jacobian matrix are negative, as shown in what follows. Thus, the civilian industry maximizes profit, as in what follows.
From this maximization, demand function for labor, l cA^D , the demand function for the armed force, d fA^D , and supply function, x c1A^S , are derived as in what follows.
In [40] := f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; pib = p * f3 − w * l1 − tf1 * dcb; s1b = Simplify@Solve@D@pib, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; slb = Solve@PowerExpand@D@pib, l1D 0 ê. s1bD, l1D@@1DD; l1db = l1 ê. slb; sdb = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1b ê. slbDD; zf1db = d0 ê. sdb; x1sb = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. slb ê. sdbDD; 8slb, sdb, 8x1sb<<; 
From this maximization, demand function for consumption good, x c1hA^D , and the demand function for the armed force, d hA^D , are derived. In Lindahl mechanism, by the correct selection of 0 §t f1 §1, the following equations must hold.
d hA^D =d fA^D (10AA)
In the computation of general equilibrium with Lindahl mechanism, the Newton method is utilized with the normalization of w=1. We have the following general equilibrium prices. It is checked that the same defense level is demanded from the civilian industry and the household. The solution under "draft system" is not Pareto-optimum, since the utility level under "draft system" is smaller than the one under "volunteer system". Oi [1967] computed the utility difference using surplus concept in the partial equilibrium analysis, and his argument contributed to the US adoption of all volunteer system in 1973. In what follows, we return to the "all volunteer system".
optimum$defense5IA.nbü Region B with Population 200
Population in region B, L 0 B , is assumed to be 200. Region B also faces the hostile intruder C. Region B must offset the effect of attack by intruder C. Without the counterattack by region B, the intruder C invade freely into the region B. With the increase of the armed force in region B, the invasion by the intruder C could be reduced, thus, raising output for region B. There are two industries in region B. The industry 1 is the civilian good industry, which is owned by the households, producing the civilian good, x c1B , hiring labor, l cB , where output depends on the level of armed force, d B . Production function is assumed to be of the following Cobb-Douglass type, identical to the region A's production function.
The industry 2 is the military good industry, which is owned by the B's government, producing the military good, m B , utilizing civilian good, x mc1B , and labor, l mB . Production function is assumed to be of the following Cobb-Douglas type. 
The government provides the level of the armed force by the minimum cost principle subject to (2B) where the price of civilian good is p c1B and the wage rate is w, on the assumption that the military personnel can be drafted with the civilian wage rate. Thus, given d B 0 , the government computes the demand for civilian good, x m1B D , the demand for labor, l mB D , and the demand for military personnel, v AB D , given p c1B and w, by solving min p c1B x m1B +w(l mB +v B ) subject to (2) and
In this section, suppose that (3B) is specified by the CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) type:
Furthermore, parameters are stipulated by Next, we examine the public good aspect of armed force. The service of armed force raises output of consumption good by offsetting the damage from invasion. It also raises the utility level of household. Thus, it has the property of public good. Lindahl mechanism has been known to achieve optimum provision of public good. In this mechanism, the government announces arbitrary shares of burden for providing public good to each member of the society. Each member replies the desired level of the armed force. There is no guarantee that those replied levels of armed force are the same. If they are not the same, the government announces different shares of burden to each member. Each member, then, replies the desired level of the armed force. If they are not the same, the government announces different shares of burden to each member. Continuing this process, the government searches for the consensus of level of armed force among the members. The consumption good industry also shares the burden of keeping the armed force. Suppose that t f1 is the share of burden for the consumption good industry. The behavior of the industry is the following profit maximization.
From this maximization, demand function for labor, l cB D , the demand function for the armed force, d fB D , and supply function, x c1B S , are derived as in what follows.
In[57]:= f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; pi = p * f3 − w * l1 − tf1 * dc; s1 = Simplify@Solve@D@pi, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; sl = Solve@PowerExpand@D@pi, l1D 0 ê. s1D, l1D@@1DD; l1d = l1 ê. sl; sd = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1 ê. slDD; zf1d = d0 ê. sd; x1s = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. sl ê. sdDD; 8sl, sd, 8x1s<<;
The resulting (expected) maximum profit, p B , is computed as follows. This profit is distributed to the household in region B.
In [65] 
The last agent is the (aggregate) household. As in the traditional approach, it maximizes utility subject to income constraint. Utility function is assumed to be of the following Cobb-Douglass type.
The government asks the desired level of armed force, by stipulating the share of burden for the household as t hB =1-t f1 . The household's behavior is formulated as in what follows.
In this paper, the household has no choice between working at civilian industry or military industry, enjoying leisure hours, and volunteering for the military personnel. In a sense, the fixed number of enjoyable leisure hours is subtracted from the initial holding of leisure hours. The numbers (or hours) of volunteers (or draftees) required for the armed force and required workers at the military industry are computed by the government and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry, with the military wage paid at the civilian wage rate, w. Thus,
given p c1B , w and t hB , the household expresses its desired armed force, which implies that government computes the number (hours) of required military personnel and the one of workers at the military industry by the minimum cost principle, and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry. The remaining workers (or working hours) are employed at the civilian industry.
For the purpose of simulation, in this paper, parameters are stipulated.
From this maximization, demand function for consumption good, x c1hB D , and the demand function for the armed force,
ü
General Equilibrium with Lindahl Mechanism
In the above examination, we derived demand and supply functions with p c1B , w, and t f1 , as the parameters. In Lindahl mechanism, by the correct selection of 0 §t f1 §1,
must hold. The selection of t f1 , however, must be done jointly with p c1B and w, since in order to compute the minimum cost for providing d B , prices, p c1B and w, must be known beforehand. Thus, p c1B , w, and t f1 as well as d B 0 must be determined in the context of general equilibrium. The consumption good market is in equilibrium if the following equation holds.
In the computation of general equilibrium with Lindahl mechanism, the Newton method is utilized with the normalization of w=1. 
It is confirmed that the Walras-Lindahl mechanism is locally stable at general equilibrium, since all the eigen values of the Jacobian matrix are negative, as shown in what follows. In this section, the defense alliance between the two regions is examined, where the civilian industries operate in each region, while civilian goods produced in each region are consumed in each region, so that there is no national market for the civilian good. It is assumed, however, labors migrate between the regions freely. There are population of L 0 A +L 0 B in this alliance. Production functions of the civilian industries are stipulated in (1A) and (1B). Production function of the military industry is stipulated in (2). It is assumed that f 2 does not depend on d as before. Alliance's level of armed force, d , is stipulated in (3). The formation of alliance does not imply the formation of a nation in the sense that civilian goods produced by each region are consumed by household in each region, so that the civilian good's price may be different across the regions. Let p cA be the price of civilian goods in region A, while p cB is the price of civilian goods in region B. Since L 0 A <L 0 B is assumed, p cA < p cB may well happen. Indeed, when there is no alliance between the two regions, the price in the region A is smaller than in region B, as shown in the previous section. In what follows, it is examined if there exists general equilibrium, in which p cA < p cB holds.
To do so, suppose that ü Civilian Industry in Region A
The consumption good industry in region A also shares the burden of keeping the armed force. Suppose that t f1A is the share of burden for the consumption good industry in region A. The behavior of the industry is the following profit maximization. In [80] := f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; piA = pA * f3 − w * l1 − tf1A * dcA; s1A = Simplify@Solve@D@piA, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; slA = Solve@PowerExpand@D@piA, l1D 0 ê. s1AD, l1D@@1DD; l1dA = l1 ê. slA; sdA = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1A ê. slADD; df1dA = d0 ê. sdA; x1sA = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. slA ê. sdADD; 8slA, sdA, 8x1sA<<;
In [88] := re1A = Simplify@PowerExpand@piA ê. slA ê. sdADD;
ü Civilian Industry in Region B
The consumption good industry in region B also shares the burden of keeping the armed force. Suppose that t f1B is the share of burden for the consumption good industry. The behavior of the industry is the following profit maximization. f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; piB = pB * f3 − w * l1 − tf1B * dcA; s1B = Simplify@Solve@D@piB, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; slB = Solve@PowerExpand@D@piB, l1D 0 ê. s1BD, l1D@@1DD; l1dB = l1 ê. slB; sdB = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1B ê. slBDD; df1dB = d0 ê. sdB; x1sB = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. slB ê. sdBDD; 8slB, sdB, 8x1sB<<;
In [97] := re1B = Simplify@PowerExpand@piB ê. slB ê. sdBDD;
ü Household in Region A
The (aggregate) household in Region A maximizes utility subject to income constraint. Utility function is assumed to be (6A). The government asks the desired level of armed force, by stipulating the share of burden for the household as t h2A . The household's behavior is formulated as in what follows.
Thus, given p cA , w and t hA , the household expresses its desired armed force, which implies that government computes the number (hours) of required military personnel and the one of workers at the military industry by the minimum cost principle, and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry. The remaining workers (or working hours) are employed at the civilian industry. In [98] := u1A = xc1^H1 ê 2L * d0^H1 ê 2L; Simplify@sol2A = Solve@8D@u1A, xc1D ê D@u1A, d0D pA ê Hth2A * D@dcA, d0DL, pA * xc1 + th2A * dcA == w * HL0AL + re1A<, 8xc1, d0<D@@1DD ê. 8w → 1<D; xc1hAd = xc1 ê. sol2A; dhAd = d0 ê. sol2A ; 8xc1hAd, dhAd<; ü Household in Region B
The (aggregate) household in Region B maximizes utility subject to income constraint. Utility function is assumed to be (6B). The government asks the desired level of armed force, by stipulating the share of burden for the household as t h2B . The household's behavior is formulated as in what follows.
Thus, given p cB , w and t hB , the household expresses its desired armed force, which implies that government computes the number (hours) of required military personnel and the one of workers at the military industry by the minimum cost principle, and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry. The remaining workers (or working hours) are employed at the civilian industry. In[101]:= u1B = xc1^H1 ê 2L * d0^H1 ê 2L; Simplify@sol2B = Solve@8D@u1B, xc1D ê D@u1B, d0D pB ê Hth2B * D@dcA, d0DL, pB * xc1 + th2B * dcA == w * HL0BL + re1B<, 8xc1, d0<D@@1DD ê. 8w → 1<D; xc1hBd = xc1 ê. sol2B; dhBd = d0 ê. sol2B; 8xc1hBd, dhBd<;
ü General Equilibrium with Lindahl Mechanism
In the above examination, we derived demand and supply functions with p cA , p cB , w, t f1A , t f1B , t h2A ,and t h2B , as the parameters. In Lindahl mechanism, the coalition government selects 0 §t f1A §1, 0 §t f1B §1, 0 §t h2A §1, 0 §t h2B §1, t f1A +t f1B +t h2A +t h2B =1, which guarantees
The selection of t f1A , t f1B , t h2A , and t h2B , however, must be done jointly with p cA , p cB , and w, since in order to compute the minimum cost for providing d f , prices, p cA (and p cB ) and w, must be known beforehand. Thus, p cA , p cB , w, t f1A , t f1B , t h2A , and t h2B as well as d 0 must be determined in the context of general equilibrium. The consumption good market is in equilibrium if the following equation holds.
Note that we search for the prices, which satisfies (14), so that all the civilian goods, required in military industry, are purchased in region A. Labor market is in equilibrium if the following equation holds.
In[107]:= z1 = HHxm1 ê. solxAL + xc1hAd − Hx1sA ê. w → 1LL ê. w → 1; z2 = Hxc1hBd − Hx1sB ê. w → 1LL ê. w → 1; z3 = Simplify@Hdf1dA − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z4 = Simplify@Hdf1dB − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z5 = Simplify@HdhAd − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z6 = Simplify@HdhBd − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z7 = Simplify@L0A + L0B − HHlm ê. sollAL + Hv ê. solvAL + Hl1dAL + Hl1dBLL ê. w → 1D; z1t = z1 ê. 8pA → pA@tD, pB → pB@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z2t = z2 ê. 8pA → pA@tD, pB → pB@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z3t = z3 ê. 8pA → pA@tD, pB → pB@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z4t = z4 ê. 8pA → pA@tD, pB → pB@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z5t = z5 ê. 8pA → pA@tD, pB → pB@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z6t = z6 ê. 8pA → pA@tD, pB → pB@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z7t = z7 ê. 8pA → pA@tD, pB → pB@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; check2 = NDSolve@8D@pA@tD, tD z1t, D@pB@tD, tD z2t, D@tf1A@tD, tD z3t, D@tf1B@tD, tD z4t, D@th2A@tD, tD z5t, D@th2B@tD, tD z6t, D@d0@tD, tD z7t, pA@0D 1, pB@0D 1, tf1A@0D 0.1, tf1B@0D 0.1, th2A@0D 0.3, th2B@0D 0.5, d0@0D 1<, 8pA@tD, pB@tD, tf1A@tD, tf1B@tD, th2A@tD, th2B@tD, d0@tD<, 8t, 0, 1000<D ;
We have local stability since the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium shows the negativity except for one, which is zero.
In[118]:= check3 = 88D@z1, pAD, D@z1, pBD, D@z1, tf1AD, D@z1, tf1BD, D@z1, th2AD, D@z1, th2BD, D@z1, d0D<, 8D@z2, pAD, D@z2, pBD, D@z2, tf1AD, D@z2, tf1BD, D@z2, th2AD, D@z2, th2BD, D@z2, d0D<, 8D@z3, pAD, D@z3, pBD, D@z3, tf1AD, D@z3, tf1BD, D@z3, th2AD, D@z3, th2BD, D@z3, d0D<, 8D@z4, pAD, D@z4, pBD, D@z4, tf1AD, D@z4, tf1BD, D@z4, th2AD, D@z4, th2BD, D@z4, d0D<, 8D@z5, pAD, D@z5, pBD, D@z5, tf1AD, D@z5, tf1BD, D@z5, th2AD, D@z5, th2BD, D@z5, d0D<, 8D@z6, pAD, D@z6, pBD, D@z6, tf1AD, D@z6, tf1BD, D@z6, th2AD, D@z6, th2BD, D@z6, d0D<, 8D@z7, pAD, D@z7, pBD, D@z7, tf1AD, D@z7, tf1BD, D@z7, th2AD, D@z7, th2BD, D@z7, d0D<< ê. w → 1 ê. soleD; 
304.344
In any way, by the alliance in this section, the both region is made better off, so that this alliance satisfies the feasibility condition. It is examined next if the resource allocation in this alliance is Pareto-optimal. If it is Pareto optimal, u 1 A1 * must be the maximal utility level for region A, given the utility level for resion B at u 1 B1 *. Thus, u 1 A1 * must be the solution to the following maximization.
By the classical Lagrangian method, the maximal solution can be computed as in what follows.
In[127]:= ff = xA1^H1 ê 2L * z^H1 ê 2L + r1 H xB1^H1 ê 2L * z^H1 ê 2L − u1B1DL + r2 * Hz − Hv^H1 ê 2L + Hlm^H1 ê 2L * xm1^H1 ê 2LL^H1 ê 2LL^H2LL + r3 * HHxm1 + xA1 + xB1L − lc1A^H1 ê 3L * z^H1 ê 3L − lc1B^H1 ê 3L * z^H1 ê 3LL + r4 * Hlc1A + lc1B + lm + v − L0A − L0BL; The reason for the non-Pareto optimality appears to stem from the separate markets for the civilian industries. If this separation is overcome, we may well achieve the Pareto optimality. We proceed to this examination.
IIB: Economic Integration (without Defense Alliance) of Regions A and B: National Commodity Markets, and Reagional All Volunteer Force System
(The military industry's demand functions for civilian goods, labor, and the government's demand function for military personnel, and minimum cost function are common to all sections in this paper.)
In this section, economic integration (without defense alliance) between the two regions is examined, where the civilian industries operate in each region, while civilian goods produced in each region are consumed in the integrated (national) market, so that there is a market for the civilian good. It is assumed that labors do not migrate between the regions. Production functions of the civilian industries are stipulated in (1A) and (1B The resulting (expected) maximum profit, p A , is computed as follows. This profit is distributed to the household in region A.
ü Civilian Industry in Region B
The consumption good industry in region B also shares the burden of keeping the armed force along with the household in region B. Suppose that t f1BB is the share of burden for the consumption good industry, while 1-t f1BB is the share for the household. The behavior of the industry is the following profit maximization. In [141] := f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; piBB = p * f3 − w * l1 − tf1BB * dcAA; s1BB = Simplify@Solve@D@piBB, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; slBB = Solve@PowerExpand@D@piBB, l1D 0 ê. s1BBD, l1D@@1DD; l1dBB = l1 ê. slBB; sdBB = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1BB ê. slBBDD; df1dBB = d0 ê. sdBB; x1sBB = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. slBB ê. sdBBDD; 8slBB, sdBB, 8x1sBB<<;
The resulting (expected) maximum profit, p B , is computed as follows. This profit is distributed to the household in region B. In [150] := u1A = xc1^H1 ê 2L * d0^H1 ê 2L; Simplify@sol2AA = Solve@8D@u1A, xc1D ê D@u1A, d0D p ê Hth2AA * D@dcAA, d0DL, p * xc1 + th2AA * dcAA == w * HL0AL + re1AA<, 8xc1, d0<D@@1DD ê. 8w → 1<D; xc1hAdA = xc1 ê. sol2AA ê. 8th2AA → 1 − tf1AA<; dhAdA = d0 ê. sol2AA ê. 8th2AA → 1 − tf1AA<; 8xc1hAdA, dhAdA<; ü Household in Region B
The (aggregate) household in Region B maximizes utility subject to income constraint. Utility function is assumed to be (6B). The government asks the desired level of armed force, by stipulating the share of burden for the household as t h2BB =1-t f1BB . The household's behavior is formulated as in what follows.
For the purpose of simulation, in this paper, parameters are stipulated by (8B). From this maximization, demand function for consumption good, x c1hB D , and the demand function for the armed force, d hB D are derived as in what follows.
In [153] := u1B = xc1^H1 ê 2L * d0^H1 ê 2L; Simplify@sol2BB = Solve@8D@u1B, xc1D ê D@u1B, d0D p ê Hth2BB * D@dcAA, d0DL, p * xc1 + th2BB * dcAA == w * HL0BL + re1BB<, 8xc1, d0<D@@1DD ê. 8w → 1<D; xc1hBdB = xc1 ê. sol2BB ê. 8th2BB → 1 − tf1BB<; dhBdB = d0 ê. sol2BB ê. 8th2BB → 1 − tf1BB<; 8xc1hBdB, dhBdB<;
ü General Equilibrium with Lindahl Mechanism
In the above examination, we derived demand and supply functions with p c , w, t f1AA , and t f1BB as the parameters. In the Lindahl mechanism, each regional government selects 0 §t f1AA §1, 0 §t f1BB §1, which guarantees
The selection of t f1AA and t f1BB , however, must be done jointly with p c and w, since in order to compute the minimum cost for providing d A and d B , prices, p c and w, must be known beforehand. Thus, p c , w, t f1AA , and t f1BB as well as d A and d B must be determined in the context of general equilibrium. The consumption good market is in equilibrium if the following equation holds.
In[158]:= z1 = HHxm1A + xm1B + xc1hAdA + xc1hBdBL ê. w → 1L − HHx1sAA ê. w → 1L + Hx1sBB ê. w → 1LL; z2 = Hdf1dAA − dhAdAL ê. w → 1; z3 = Hdf1dBB − dhBdBL ê. w → 1; z4 = L0A − HlmA + vA + Hl1dAALL ê. w → 1; z5 = L0B − HlmB + vB + Hl1dBBLL ê. w → 1; z1t = z1 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1AA → tf1AA@tD, tf1BB → tf1BB@tD, dA → dA@tD, dB → dB@tD<; z2t = z2 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1AA → tf1AA@tD, tf1BB → tf1BB@tD, dA → dA@tD, dB → dB@tD<; z3t = z3 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1AA → tf1AA@tD, tf1BB → tf1BB@tD, dA → dA@tD, dB → dB@tD<; z4t = z4 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1AA → tf1AA@tD, tf1BB → tf1BB@tD, dA → dA@tD, dB → dB@tD<; z5t = z5 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1AA → tf1AA@tD, tf1BB → tf1BB@tD, dA → dA@tD, dB → dB@tD<; check2 = NDSolve@8D@p@tD, tD z1t, D@tf1AA@tD, tD z2t, D@tf1BB@tD, tD z3t, D@dA@tD, tD z4t, D@dB@tD, tD z5t, p@0D 1, tf1AA@0D 0.1, tf1BB@0D 0.1,  dA@0D 1, dB@0D 1<, 8p@tD, tf1AA@tD, tf1BB@tD, dA@tD We have local stability since all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium shows the negativity.
In[168]:= check3 = 88D@z1, pD, D@z1, tf1AAD, D@z1, tf1BBD, D@z1, dAD, D@z1, dBD<, 8D@z2, pD, D@z2, tf1AAD, D@z2, tf1BBD, D@z2, dAD, D@z2, dBD<, 8D@z3, pD, D@z3, tf1AAD, D@z3, tf1BBD, D@z3, dAD, D@z3, dBD<, 8D@z4, pD, D@z4, tf1AAD, D@z4, tf1BBD, D@z4, dAD, D@z4, dBD<, 8D@z5, pD, D@z5, tf1AAD, D@z5, tf1BBD, D@z5, dAD, D@z5, dBD<< ê. w → 1 ê. soleE;
In [ 
This Lindahl solution is expressed as
For the comparison with separate defense case, the regions' utility levels in the coalition, u 1 A E and u 1 B E , are computed. Note, however, that each is smaller than the utility level for the defense alliance.
ü Civilian Industry in Region A
The consumption good industry in region A also shares the burden of keeping the armed force. Suppose that t f1A is the share of burden for the consumption good industry in region A. The behavior of the industry is the following profit maximization. In [174] := f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; pi = p * f3 − w * l1 − tf1A * dc; s1 = Simplify@Solve@D@pi, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; sl = Solve@PowerExpand@D@pi, l1D 0 ê. s1D, l1D@@1DD; l1dA = l1 ê. sl; sd = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1 ê. slDD; df1dA = d0 ê. sd; x1sA = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. sl ê. sdDD; 8sl, sd, 8x1sA<<;
The resulting (expected) maximum profit, p A , is computed as follows. This profit is distributed to the household in region A. ü Civilian Industry in Region B
The consumption good industry in region B also shares the burden of keeping the armed force. Suppose that t f1B is the share of burden for the consumption good industry. The behavior of the industry is the following profit maximization. In [183] := f3 = l1^H1 ê 3L * d0^H1 ê 3L; pi = p * f3 − w * l1 − tf1B * dc; s1 = Simplify@Solve@D@pi, d0D 0, d0D@@1DDD; sl = Solve@PowerExpand@D@pi, l1D 0 ê. s1D, l1D@@1DD; l1dB = l1 ê. sl; sd = Simplify@PowerExpand@s1 ê. slDD; df1dB = d0 ê. sd; x1sB = Simplify@PowerExpand@f3 ê. sl ê. sdDD; 8sl, sd, 8x1s<<;
In [191] 
Thus, given p c1 , w and t hA , the household expresses its desired armed force, which implies that government computes the number (hours) of required military personnel and the one of workers at the military industry by the minimum cost principle, and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry. The remaining workers (or working hours) are employed at the civilian industry.
For the purpose of simulation, in this paper, parameters are stipulated by (8A In [192] := u1A = xc1^H1 ê 2L * d0^H1 ê 2L; Simplify@sol2A = Solve@8D@u1A, xc1D ê D@u1A, d0D p ê Hth2A * D@dc, d0DL, p * xc1 + th2A * dc == w * L0A + re1A<, 8xc1, d0<D@@1DD ê. 8w → 1<D; xc1hAd = xc1 ê. sol2A; dhAd = d0 ê. sol2A; ü Household in Region B
Thus, given p c1 , w and t hB , the household expresses its desired armed force, which implies that government computes the number (hours) of required military personnel and the one of workers at the military industry by the minimum cost principle, and a part of the household must serve in the armed force or work at the military industry. The remaining workers (or working hours) are employed at the civilian industry.
For the purpose of simulation, in this paper, parameters are stipulated by (8B In [195] := u1B = xc1^H1 ê 2L * d0^H1 ê 2L; Simplify@sol2B = Solve@8D@u1B, xc1D ê D@u1B, d0D p ê Hth2B * D@dc, d0DL, p * xc1 + th2B * dc == w * L0B + re1B<, 8xc1, d0<D@@1DD ê. 8w → 1<D; xc1hBd = xc1 ê. sol2B; dhBd = d0 ê. sol2B;
ü General Equilibrium with Lindahl Mechanism
In the above examination, we derived demand and supply functions with p c1 , w, t f1 , t h2A ,and t h2B , as the parameters. In Lindahl mechanism, the coalition government selects 0 §t f1A §1, 0 §t f1B §1, 0 §t h2A §1, 0 §t h2B §1, t f1A +t f1B +t h2A +t h2B =1, which guarantees
The selection of t f1A , t f1B , t h2A , and t h2B , however, must be done jointly with p c1 and w, since in order to compute the minimum cost for providing d f , prices, p c1 and w, must be known beforehand. Thus, p c1 , w, t f1A , t f1B , t h2A , and t h2B as well as d 0 must be determined in the context of general equilibrium. The consumption good market is in equilibrium if the following equation holds.
In [198] This Lindahl solution is expressed as { p c1 **, t f1A **, t f1B **, t h2A **, t h2B **, d 0 **}. It is confirmed that the level of armed force of this alliance, d 0 **, determined in this specification, is equal to the demand from each agent. For the comparison with separate defense case, the regions' utility levels in the alliance, u 1 A1 ** and u 1 B1 **, are computed.
In [201] Thus, the movement from the alliance to the formation of a nation is not Pareto-improvement, while the resource allocation in the formation of a nation is Pareto-optimal. Alternatively, p c1 **, t f1 **, t h2A **, t h2B **, and d 0 ** can be computed by the following Walras-Lindahl mechanism in the form of differential equations, where s is time.
In ( In [204] := z1 = HHxm1 ê. solxL + xc1hAd + xc1hBd − x1sA − x1sBL ê. w → 1; z2 = Simplify@Hdf1dA − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z3 = Simplify@Hdf1dB − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z4 = Simplify@HdhAd − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z5 = Simplify@HdhBd − HdhAd + df1dA + df1dB + dhBdL ê 4L ê. w → 1D; z6 = Simplify@L0A + L0B − HHlm ê. sollL + Hv ê. solvL + Hl1dAL + Hl1dBLL ê. w → 1D; z1t = z1 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z2t = z2 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z3t = z3 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z4t = z4 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z5t = z5 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; z6t = z6 ê. 8p → p@tD, tf1A → tf1A@tD, tf1B → tf1B@tD, th2A → th2A@tD, th2B → th2B@tD, d0 → d0@tD<; check2 = NDSolve@8D@p@tD, tD z1t, D@tf1A@tD, tD z2t, D@tf1B@tD, tD z3t, D@th2A@tD, tD z4t, D@th2B@tD, tD z5t, D@d0@tD, tD z6t, p@0D 1, tf1A@0D 0.1, tf1B@0D 0.1, th2A@0D 0.3, th2B@0D 0.5, d0@0D 1<, 8p@tD, tf1A@tD, tf1B@tD, th2A@tD, th2B@tD, d0@tD<, 8t, 0, 1000<D ; 
8312.893<
Indeed, the Jacobian matrix at the Lindahl solution shows the negativity of eigen values except one eigen value of zero.
In [216] := check3 = 88D@z1, pD, D@z1, tf1AD, D@z1, tf1BD, D@z1, th2AD, D@z1, th2BD, D@z1, d0D<, 8D@z2, pD, D@z2, tf1AD, D@z2, tf1BD, D@z2, th2AD, D@z2, th2BD, D@z2, d0D<, 8D@z3, pD, D@z3, tf1AD, D@z3, tf1BD, D@z3, th2AD, D@z3, th2BD, D@z3, d0D<, 8D@z4, pD, D@z4, tf1AD, D@z4, tf1BD, D@z4, th2AD, D@z4, th2BD, D@z4, d0D<, 8D@z5, pD, D@z5, tf1AD, D@z5, tf1BD, D@z5, th2AD, D@z5, th2BD, D@z5, d0D<, 8D@z6, pD, D@z6, tf1AD, D@z6, tf1BD, D@z6, th2AD, D@z6, th2BD, D@z6, d0D<< ê. w → 1 ê. sole; Finally, it is examined if the Walras-Lindahl solution is Pareto optimal. If it is Pareto optimal, u 1 A1 ** must be the maximal utility level for region A, given the utility level for region B at u 1 B1 **. Thus, u 1 A1 ** must be the solution to the following maximization. ff = xA1^H1 ê 2L * z^H1 ê 2L + r1 H xB1^H1 ê 2L * z^H1 ê 2L − u1B1NL + r2 * Hz − Hv^H1 ê 2L + Hlm^H1 ê 2L * xm1^H1 ê 2LL^H1 ê 2LL^H2LL + r3 * HHxm1 + xA1 + xB1L − lc1A^H1 ê 3L * z^H1 ê 3L − lc1B^H1 ê 3L * z^H1 ê 3LL + r4 * Hlc1A + lc1B + lm + v − L0A − L0BL; 888.3347, 14.3155, 24.9383, 5.0594, 23.8139, 34.7628, 34.7628, 206.66, 34.7628, 34.7628< In 
Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to examine some topics concerning national defense in the general equilibrium framework with public good. In section I, 2-region general equilibrium model with public good, regional defense, is constructed, where these regions face a common hostile intruder. The optimum defense levels for each region was computed, by simulation approach, when there is no alliance between the two regions. Region A is endowed with smaller population, so that the civilian good's price is lower than in region B. In the computation of optimal defense levels in two regions, Lindahl mechanism was adopted as well as Walrasian general equilibrium approach. The approach in this paper was named Lindahl-Walras mechanism.
In section I, the difference between "the all-volunteer force system" and "the draft system" was examined in terms of Pareto-optimum. "All-volunteer force system" recruits military personnel through labor market, while "draft system" recruits them directly, without through labor market, it is expected that the former achieves the Pareto-optimality, while the latter, it is expected, cannot achieve the optimality. In this paper, it was shown that Lindahl-Walras mechanism guarantees general equilibrium with public good in both systems, and the above expectation is indeed confirmed correct. Oi [1967 Oi [ ,1976 computed the dead-weight-loss in adopting "the draft system", contributing to the U.S. adoption of "all-volunteer force system" in 1973. His approach is partial equilibrium approach. The present paper reconstructed his argument in terms of general equilibrium with public good.
From section II, the two processes to the national economy with integrated defense system and integrated market were examined. The first process is "first, the integrated defense system, then, to the overall national economy with integrated markets". The second is "first, the integrated markets, then, to the overall national economy with integrated defense system. In section II, the first step in the first process: the case of integrated defense system without integrated market, was examined. If the optimal level of defense is jointly planned for two regions, while the civilian good markets are separately organized, then Pareto-improvement is achieved; i.e. utility level for each region rises compared with separate defense plan and separate markets.
In section III, the first step in the second process: the case of integrated market without integrated defense system was examined. If the optimal level of defense is separately planned for two regions, while the civilian good markets are integrated, then Pareto-improvement is achieved; i.e. utility level for each region rises compared with separate defense plan and separate markets. In section IV, the case of unified defense system with unified national market for civilian goods was examined. When this total unification is realized, it achieves the Pareto-optimalty. It is shown, however, that in the first process, the phase from the first step to the final integration is not Pareto-improvement, while in the second process, the phase from the first step to the final integration is the Pareto-improvement. Thus, the second process: "first, the integrated markets, then, to the overall national economy with integrated defense system, may be a natural selection.
